If you have any knowledge of or sympathy for Aceh,
this insightful and well-researched article from Inside Indonesia ought to send a chill down your
spine.
An unlikely alliance between former rebels and a former New Order tormentor will test the limits of Partai Aceh loyalty
--Shane J. Barter
The
highly anticipated 2014 Indonesian national elections are fast approaching. For
years, the big question has been what happens after the sitting president,
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), finishes his second and final term. SBY utterly
failed to groom a successor within Partai Demokrat (PD), evident with his
choice of the capable but colourless Boediono as his 2009 running mate. While
Jakarta Governor Joko Widodo of the PDIP (Democratic Struggle Party) provides
some excitement, the list of plausible candidates seems uninspiring. For many,
the greatest fear is the candidature of Prabowo Subianto, Suharto’s former
son-in-law and one-time Kopassus (Special Forces) Commander widely thought to
be responsible for scores of abuses against student protestors, ethnic Chinese,
East Timorese, and Acehnese.
In
the lead-up to the 2014 elections, Prabowo has formed a shocking alliance with
Aceh’s former rebels. Thus far, Partai Aceh (PA) has dominated the province’s
electoral landscape, winning district and provincial executive posts and
securing majorities in district and provincial legislatures. In national
contests, PA helped SBY and his party deepen their support in Aceh. Now, the
former rebels are asking Acehnese voters to do the unthinkable: vote for a New
Order stalwart and symbol of oppression. This represents an acid test of PA
loyalty, and may propel changes in Acehnese politics.
A changing landscape
With
the field of potential presidential candidates emerging, regional elites across
Indonesia are already jockeying for allies, promising to deliver votes in
exchange for access and promotion. One of the most interesting dynamics is
unfolding in Aceh, the site of the 2004 tsunami and a long-standing
secessionist conflict that was resolved in 2005, due in part to SBY’s efforts.
The rebels laid down their weapons with the promise of forming a political
party and competing in elections. Local parties are expressly forbidden in
Indonesia for fear that they will serve narrow, parochial interests. An
exception was made for Aceh, where the former Free Aceh Movement (GAM) rebels
created Partai Aceh. The province has thus become a test case for sub-national
parties in Indonesia. Of course, there were fears that PA would only care about
local politics and serve ethnic Acehnese interests. Far from refusing to
participate in national politics, PA has become deeply involved, but in
unexpected ways.
While
largely successful, Indonesia’s experiment with local parties in Aceh has
hardly been perfect. Organised through the Aceh Transitional Committee
(KPA), the former rebels have come to dominate the local economy, with shady
construction contracts fuelling the PA political machine. The International
Crisis Group (ICG) has dubbed the KPA ‘the greatest scourge of post-conflict
Aceh’, running mafia-like protection rackets and executing political rivals.
Aceh has seen some political violence as PA intimidated local and national
parties in the 2009 elections and factions within PA have become involved in
turf wars. As expected, PA also uses exclusive ethnic cues, failing to reach
out to Aceh’s numerous minorities.
PA
has seen a quick turnover in leadership, with liberal elements muscled out by
hardliners. While figures such as Irwandi Yusuf and Nurdin Rahman won early
elections, former GAM guerilla commanders and elites close to the late Hasan di
Tiro dashed their reelection bids. In 2012, a bitter conflict led to Zaini
Abdullah, GAM’s former ‘Foreign Minister’ being elected Governor of Aceh. He
was joined in the former head of GAM’s armed forces, Muzakkir Manaf, serving as
his second-in-command. Their victory signaled a turn towards greater
corruption, an increased use of ethnic cues, and greater endorsement for Aceh’s
local syaria laws.
Since
the 2006 elections for governor, the former rebels have dominated Aceh’s
political landscape, a testament to their enduring popularity. This said, in
the 2009 elections, PA support was concentrated in the north of the province,
where they won district and provincial elections in landslide numbers. On the
west coast and around the provincial capital support for GAM was less strong,
ethnic minority districts voters supported national parties such as Golkar.
Generally though, it can be said that PA dominates Aceh’s politics and remains
genuinely popular, a legacy of GAM resistance to abusive Indonesian forces and
a result of their appeal to a sense of Acehnese ethnic solidarity.
National
elections have presented a more complex picture for PA leaders and Aceh’s
voters. Local parties are allowed to run only for provincial and district
legislative seats, which means that PA leaders are free to endorse national
parties in contests for the People’s Representative Council (the DPR,
Indonesia’s national parliament), if they choose, but they cannot run for such
positions under their own party banner. They also have an open slate when it
comes to endorsing presidential candidates.
In
2009, many voters in the north of the province voted informally by failing to
correctly fill-out their ballots for the national election, while at the same
time voting for former rebels in district and provincial contests. This partial
boycott was a result of continued resentment of Indonesia, instructions from
local PA personalities, and the absence of former rebel candidates in national
races. This said, most of the province showed intense support for SBY’s Partai
Demokrat in the national parliament vote, with percentages rivaling PA
dominance in the provincial and district legislatures. PA leaders suggested
that the success of SBY and PD was due to their endorsement—indeed, some PA
politicians supported the PD in a personal capacity during the election.
Recognising
that he would win the July 2009 presidential elections, former rebels supported
SBY’s reelection. Then-governor Irwandi joined SBY’s campaign team, as did many
PA politicians. Indeed, SBY won in a landslide, scoring 93 per cent of the vote
in Aceh, and PA leaders took credit for his victory. ICG reported that ‘Partai
Aceh in 2009 delivered more than 90 per cent of the vote in Aceh for the President.’
This seems questionable - PA sided with a candidate who was clearly going to
win. It is not clear how much the support of PA and its political machine the
KPA helped SBY in 2009.. Even so, as a result of district, provincial, and
national executive and legislative elections, the former rebels feel
unstoppable.
Strange bedfellows
The
2014 elections will provide a major test of PA political control and the
loyalty of Acehnese voters. Unlike in 2009, when most Acehnese voters supported
SBY because of the role he had played in the peace process, in 2014 PA wants
Acehnese voters to support a national party and a presidential candidate they
would be unlikely to choose on their own. The former rebels are aligned with
none other than Prabowo and his Gerindra party. This is a remarkable
development, surprising even for observers of Southeast Asian politics.
In
1990, fresh from a posting in East Timor, Prabowo led Kostrad (Army Strategic
Reserve) forces into Aceh, ushering in a decade of intense human rights abuses.
Prabowo’s unit burned-down the houses of suspected rebel supporters and
terrorised residents of northern Aceh. Geoffrey Robinson, a historian at the
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), notes that Prabowo’s tenure in
Aceh ‘coincided with the onset of the worst violence.’ Prabowo was more than an
abusive officer, he was part of the Suharto family. As a military official,
businessman, and former son-in-law of Suharto, Prabowo epitomises the worst of
the New Order.
To
suggest that Prabowo is unpopular in Aceh would be an understatement. Gerindra
won less than three per cent of Aceh’s national legislative vote in 2009, and
the Megawati-Prabowo ticket in the presidential elections that year came last,
with 2.3 per cent. PA leaders are aware that their new allies are hated in
Aceh. In order to reinforce their ethno-nationalist credentials prior to the
election, and assist their new allies, they have embarked on highly contentious
symbolic fights with Jakarta. Emblematically, the PA has been working to make
the former rebel flag an official provincial symbol.
In
2009, PA support for PD and SBY was informal. In 2014 however, PA is officially
aligned with Prabowo. Rumours have spread that Prabowo spent Rp.50 billion on
behalf of the winning candidates in Aceh’s 2012 elections for governor. During
the campaign, Prabowo allies in the local military command such as Sunarko,
Djali Yusuf, and M. Yahya campaigned on behalf of the Zaini Abdullah PA ticket
and then aligned with Gerindra. After the election, Gerindra donated three
modern ambulances (plastered with Prabowo’s image) to the province in a highly
publicised ceremony. Governor Zaini has publicly endorsed Prabowo, joining his
presidential campaign team, while Prabowo has spoken of his ‘intimate’ relationship
with PA. Prabowo is openly building a Gerindra stronghold in Aceh through the
former rebels.
As
the list of national legislative candidates has come out, it has become clear
that former rebels are running for Gerindra in Aceh. In the Pidie Regency, the party’s
legislative candidate is Fadhullah, a local PA secretary and Gerindra’s
provincial treasurer whose ‘work experience’ entry at the Elections Commission
reads ‘Head of GAM Commando Operations in Pidie Region.’ In Banda Aceh,
Gerindra’s candidate is TA Khalid, another former GAM fighter, who serves as
Gerindra’s provincial secretary. Other former rebels playing roles within
Gerindra include chairman Maulisman Hanafiah, and deputy governor and KPA head,
Muzakkir Manaf, who is serving as Gerindra’s official provincial ‘patron’.
The
common cause found by PA and Prabowo is a remarkable development. It shows how
money and power dominates in Aceh’s politics, rather than principles or
ideology. It is also an important lesson about the potential role of local parties
in Indonesia. Instead of PA promoting narrow parochial interests at the expense
of the country, patronage represents a centrifugal force keeping the country
together.
The Prabowo test
PA’s
alliance with Prabowo and Gerindra poses serious challenges to supporters. On
the one hand, unlike in 2009, GAM supporters will be able to vote for former
rebels in the national parliamentary elections. On the other hand, it means
they will be asked to support a party and a president representing the very
worst of the Indonesia that GAM fought against. Will Acehnese voters follow PA
and vote for former rebels under the Gerindra ticket in the April parliamentary
elections, as well as vote for Prabowo in the July presidential elections? Or,
will Acehnese voters finally diverge from the former rebels, selecting other
candidates or simply failing to fill-in their ballots?
It
may be easier to vote for Gerindra in the parliamentary elections, since this
would mean sending former rebels to Jakarta, than it will be to vote for
Prabowo for president. Of course, it depends on the final slate of candidates
and their running mates. Former governor Irwandi may yet play an important
role. After losing the tough 2012 contest for governor, Irwandi vowed to form a
rival GAM party for the 2014 elections. His National Aceh Party (PNA) has not
gained much traction, in part due to the murder of one of its local leaders.
Irwandi has been outspoken in his criticism of the Prabowo alliance and remains
popular throughout Aceh. If Irwandi threw his weight behind a rival national
party, this could represent a major challenge to the PA-Gerindra alliance.
While
early predictions are notoriously problematic in Indonesia, the PA-Gerindra
alliance does allow for some guesses. In regional legislative races, Partai
Aceh will continue to dominate in ethnically Acehnese areas of the province,
although they will not so easily command votes in national races. This may
represent the first setback Partai Aceh have faced at the ballot box, and
strengthen the hand of Irwandi’s allies in the PNA. The northern districts will
be the most interesting to watch. This region constituted the rebel heartland and
suffered the most under the New Order. Are voters in districts like Bireuen,
Pidie, and North Aceh more pro-PA or more anti-New Order?
Along
the west coast, in the district of Aceh Besar, and perhaps in East Aceh, where
GAM loyalty is less deep, Acehnese voters will be less conflicted supporting
other parties. For ethnic minorities, who have long been at odds with ethnic
Acehnese rebels, many officials are allied to Prabowo, who controls a
97,000-hectare forestry reserve in Central Aceh. Prabowo’s alliance with the
former rebels puts minority leaders in an awkward place. This tension could
open the way for Golkar to maintain and extend its traditional control over
these areas, halting Gerindra’s inroads.
The
2014 elections have much riding on them. Indonesian democracy has been good
news for Southeast Asia, a region which has proven a recalcitrant holdout in
the worldwide democratisation wave, and for the Muslim world, whose experience
with democracy has been even less inspiring. For Aceh, Prabowo and Gerindra
represent an acid test for rebel loyalty. If Acehnese voters follow the former
rebels and support Prabowo, this will indicate tremendous influence and
enduring PA power. However defiance could weaken the stranglehold the former
rebels currently enjoy over the province’s political affairs.
Shane J. Barter (sbarter@soka.edu) is associate director of the Pacific Basin
Research Center and an assistant professor of comparative politics at Soka
University of America in southern California.
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