PNA Press Release Outlines Election Fraud and Corruption, and advocates for rejection of voting results

A friend who’s head of the Political and Peace Division of the Aceh National Party (Partai Nasional Aceh /PNA) forwarded me and some mutual colleagues a translation of PNA’s Press Release that states the reasons why it refuses to accept the result of the April 9^th Legislative Election.

He writes, “Thanking you in advance for any action you can take in this matter towards improving the chances of successful democratization process in this post-conflict area where the peace process is supposed to be a model of successful post-conflict management.”

And here it is [with minor grammar edits].  Please read and share it.

 PNA WILL RESIST

The Partai Nasional Aceh (PNA) is a local party formed in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed in Helsinki on August 15 2005 that ended the 30 year bloody conflict. It was formed by ex-GAM combatants, former peace negotiators in Helsinki, human rights/humanitarian/socio-political and women activists, intellectuals, religious leaders, and traders. It has continually tried to participate in the democratic political process within the frame of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in polite, civilized practices and law and order adherence at all times. However, during the period of this so-called “fiesta of democracy” in Aceh--the legislative election of April 9 2014-- this patient and restrained attitude was responded to with intimidation, oppression, cheating, atrocities and even assassinations by one of its local rival parties, aided by the machinery and leadership of the local government of Aceh and by the local electoral commission itself.

From the early days of its formation two years ago up to the days of the votes counting, PNA has registered all sorts of cheating and violent actions perpetrated against it by officials of the rival political party as well as by the electoral commission officers, including such acts as:

1. Murders of one of the ex-regional commanders of GAM who was at the forefront of the formation of the party, of a school teacher who had just announced his candidacy for the Aceh house of representatives (DPRA), of a campaigner who was lynched to death while drinking coffee at a well-known café in the middle of capital city of North Aceh, and of another while driving home in his car.  A female candidate had parked her car in the garage of her house when it was burnt down. Several other cars belonging to party campaigners were completely wrecked. Attempted arsons on offices and houses belonging to party official are common incidents. Such incidents continued till the vote counting days.

2. Intimidation of witnesses of PNA at vote counting centers, where the Party in power [PA, Partai Aceh] has strong influence, made it impossible for these witnesses to function and about a hundred of them had to resign, fearing the safety not only of themselves but also of their families;

3.  Intimidation and violence have been carried out systematically by the Party in power by instructing voters at the polling stations to vote for the party. Video recordings are available showing a truck painted with the colors of this party parked at a polling center and polling officials directing voters where to punch [their voting card]. When a reporter and cameraman working for a major British television station asked the policeman guarding the gate to the center why he allowed the car to be parked there, the policeman said: “They are on patrol.”  Upon being asked  about officials directing voters where to punch he said: “He was just trying to help.” Incidents like this are common, only not that many have been recorded by independent reporters.

4. KIP (Independent Electoral Commission) officials from the District/Town Councils all the way up to the Provincial levels, as well as staff carrying out various duties at the polling centers such as the PPK, PPS and the KPPS have been appointed by the Party in power through the DPRA (Aceh Parliament) controlled by the Partai Aceh, and some of them are openly members of the said party. Demands by other parties, local and national, that this appointment be done by the Central Electoral Commission, were ignored.

5. The mandates of the Electoral Control Commissions of Bawaslu and Panwas are deliberately not sanctioned by the Aceh Government, making them unable to function properly, especially when their assigned budgets and operational facilities were withdrawn by the Aceh Government.

6. The voting day itself was colored by massive fraud, whereby KPPS officials openly directed voters where to punch on the ballot papers. Witnesses could not function fully as pointed out above due to intimidation. Counting of votes and later the recapitulations processes were carried out behind closed doors, with the Government saying that these these processes are an internal matter of the government and that the public and the press would be given the official tallies when they were ready. On several occasions there were power outages at the centers, and the counting process was continued with light provided by small handheld flashlights. As vote counting continued non-stop all day and all night, many witnesses were too tired to continue and abandoned their posts. The electoral commission should have informed the participating parties of this possibility so that shift teams of witnesses could be arranged in advance.

7. The Aceh government’s partiality in favor of the Party in power at all levels of the province down to the sub-districts is openly practiced and well documented, including the use of public funds and facilities for the purpose of campaigning, issuing threats of dismissals to civil servants who would fail to carry out instruction to support the candidates of the Party in power, and awarding governmental cash grants for mosques and for village heads in front of the polling centers when people are queuing to vote.

8. Money politics are practiced not only in the form of donating campaign funds without proper documentation but paying cash to voters through village heads in what is known as “dawn attacks.”  

Based on the cited grave violations of all electoral rules cited above, the Aceh National Party does hereby state categorically and firmly that:

-- WE REJECT THE “PEMILU 2014” ELECTION, including all its results

-- WE WILL NO LONGER PARTICIPATE in future Pemilu electoral stages

-- We shall take all other possible and necessary actions to fight for the political rights and dignity of the Acehnese people

-- We shall conduct resistant actions and instruct all of PNA’s regional leaderships, cadres, members and those who sympathize with the Party to conduct actions of resistance at all levels as parts of our self-defense measures against tyrannical oppression.

We do hereby call on and urge all our pro-democracy friends and the media to help distribute this public statement as widely as possible, and we thank all in advance.

Banda Aceh, 19 April 2014

IRWANSYAH

Executive Chairman

It’s Election Déjà vu All Over Again

The March 27, 2012 edition of the Jakarta Post had this headline:

Ahead of local election, police tighten grip on Aceh

The article speaks of increased tensions, weapons confiscation, heightened security in Aceh Utara, and then-incumbent gubernatorial candidate Irwandi’s reporting that his life had been threatened several times by Partai Aceh members.

The March 20, 2014  Channel News Asia/Asia Pacific outlet has this headline:

Political divide between former rebels fuels violence in Aceh

It reports that “former Aceh governor Irwandi Yusuf is a marked man and he is now being targeted by his former colleagues from rebel group - the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).” 

http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/political-divide-between/1043136.html

This is still on page one of the local papers, according to JMD staff.  They told me that yesterday was “a very hot situation in Lhokseumawe (Aceh Utara),” where Party Aceh members were shot during a campaign rally there. After the shooting on the same day,  PA members attacked PNA members at a coffee shop; the situation was finally brought under control by the police and army [possibly the Densus 88 counter-terrorism unit that was deployed in March 2012.  Plus ca change . . . ]

This current story is of interest because it gives a pretty concise overview of why there are currently 2 GAM parties duking it out for control of the province:

“Two years ago, Mr Irwandi failed to retain his position as governor and decided to form the Aceh National Party (PNA). The decision split former GAM members right down the middle.

“PNA is seen as a breakaway from the Aceh Party [PA] that has so far been the only political vehicle for former GAM members since the 2009 elections.

“The party is now contesting in this parliamentary election and the contest between former rebels has turned violent. Cases of attacks and killings have spiked since the start of the year.

PNA's vice chairman Kamaruddin Abu Bakar said: "People accused us of being behind the violence. We leave the criminals to the police to tackle. The police should enforce the law. We have called on our cadres in the Aceh Party not to resort to violence."

As the former commander of military operations in GAM, Mr Kamaruddin has a huge influence on former rebels.

However, it is unclear if he can cool tempers as political campaigning heats up.

PNA has claimed it has been the main target of attacks and might not be able to remain passive for long. [Apparently not!!]

The threat of retaliation from PNA would lead to an escalation of violence in Aceh, and that is certainly worrying.”

[so we shall see how the “coffee shop incident” plays out.]

With this being a former conflict zone, it is widely believed that former rebels have kept their old weapons. [this is common knowledge.] 

What's more worrying is that evidence suggests new weapons were used in some attacks.

Aceh Party maintains it bears no grudges against the PNA.

[Ahahahahahahahaha!  Perhaps “grudge”is not how they describe it.]

Aceh Party's vice chairman Abu Razak said: "I see my friends on the opposite side. Having their own party is normal. They are still my friends.”

Unfortunately, Mr Irwandy doesn't seem to share that sentiment. [!!!!!]

"In my view, he is still my friend. Maybe in his view, I'm his enemy," he said.

Leaders from both sides have yet to talk directly to each other, and until that happens, the former GAM rebels who were once on the same side remain enemies."

Well, as we know now, they did meet over coffee . . . .

Are you asking yourself: why is GAM against GAM in the Aceh Legislative elections?

It’s a good question, and bears some explanation.

It’s awfully convenient for Jakarta, with its long and bitter dispute with Aceh, to broadcast this version of why Aceh is so volatile: “well, it’s nobody’s fault but their own—they’re attacking each other after all.”

Unfortunately, in the history of Aceh, no one comes out smelling like a rose.

Here’s my brief Cliff-notes version (warning: small history lesson ahead):

Remember, the republic of Indonesia was not always independent; it was controlled by the British and then the Dutch until 1945, then after a bloody 4-year war with the Dutch it gained independence in 1949.  Aceh (north Sumatra) had been part of a larger and quite prosperous Sultanate (including all of Sumatra and the Malay peninsula) since 1511. 

Under the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 the British ceded their colonial possessions on Sumatra to the Dutch; the British named Aceh among these possessions even though they did not control it [of course they did!] The Dutch agreed to respect Aceh's independence at first but couldn’t help themselves and invaded again in 1871, possibly to prevent France or the US from doing it first.  This led to the 40-year Aceh War, in which the Acehnese established themselves as a formidable foe with exceptional military and fighting skills (this did not go unnoticed by the rest of Indonesia, which was having its own problems with the colonial powers at the time). The Dutch kind of won, and set up a colonial government in Aceh until World War II and the Japanese occupation of much of Indonesia.  During the occupation the Japanese tried to instill as much nationalist sentiment as possible in the more rural and remote parts of Indonesia, including Aceh.  Throughout all these events it was Aceh’s belief (fostered by various promises, agreements and assurances) that it would remain independent. Aceh revolted soon after its inclusion into an “independent Indonesia” in 1948, a situation created by a complex mix of what the Acehnese felt were betrayals and transgressions against their rights:

a)     Soekarno, the first president of Indonesia (and a member of the nationalist PNI party), reneged on his 1948 promise that if Aceh lent its trained military to assist in the war for Indonesian independence, it would be allowed to rule itself in accordance with its religious values which had been in place for centuries

b)     Aceh was politically dismantled and incorporated into the province of North Sumatra in 1950. This resulted in the Acehnese Rebellion of 1953-59, led by Governor and Ulama party leader Daud Bereueh.

c)     In 1959, the Indonesian government attempted once again to placate the Acehnese by offering wide-ranging freedom in matters relating to religion, education and culture.

 [let me tell you, we are zipping through history—this is by no means a thorough account!]

During the 1970s, under agreement with Indonesian central government (but not with Aceh), American oil and gas companies began exploitation of Aceh’s natural resources. Alleged unequal distribution of profit between Jakarta and Acehnese citizens induced Hasan di Tiro, the former ambassador of Darul Islam, to call for an Independent Aceh. He proclaimed Aceh Independence in 1976—the same year as East Timor proclaimed its own independence.  Both provinces were rewarded for this by severe and near-genocidal discipline that in Aceh’s case only ended when the 2004 tsunami killed 170,000 Acehnese with far more rapidity than the Indonesian army could have.

[Darul Islam is a group established in 1942 "aiming for the establishment of an Islamist State of Indonesia."  It has many factions but in general the group recognizes only Shari'a as a valid source of law. It’s interesting to remember, however, that the declaration of Aceh independence had to do with the unequal distribution of wealth, and not religious practice.  See, it always, always comes down to economics.  I'll have a LOT more to say about this in the next post--all my opinions, mind you.]

The movement for Aceh Independence was called the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), and had very few followers initially, but as pressure and human rights abuses from Java mounted over the next two decades, it gained widespread support from Acehnese citizens.  A brief bone-throwing by Jakarta in 2001 that ostensibly broadened Aceh’s autonomy was followed by even more brutality, and a state of emergency was proclaimed in the province that was only broken by the Tsunami’s devastation and the subsequent 2005 “peace accord.”

          Women soldiers of the Free Aceh Movement with GAM commander Abdullah Syafei’i, 1999

The following text is excerpted  from a white paper that we delivered to the Clinton Foundation at their request in 2012 and regards the state of division within GAM and possible reasons for this.

Numbers vary slightly, but approximately 3,000 of the 21,000 known GAM combatants were reported by GAM leaders to the government immediately following the [2005] peace agreement/MoU signing. There are many reasons why the large remaining numbers were not reported, chief among them being that GAM feared that the Indonesian government, once receiving the surrendered weapons of GAM’s entire militia, would renege on any peace agreement and retaliate with violence on now-unarmed “enemies of the state.”  Subsequently, the 3,000 who were registered were compensated in the form of government positions, financial remuneration, etc.  GAM members felt that these 3,000 would be the harbingers of a finally integrated province and would act as their advocates and supporters in the form of insuring that their remaining ranks of 14-18,000 would receive reintegration assistance as well.

This was not the case.  While many of the 3,000 registered members became quite powerful and “reintegrated” comfortably into their communities (Governor Irwandi himself is a former GAM leader) they abandoned many of the promises to their constituents that had elevated them to this status in the first place.  Former combatants had taken to heart Governor Irwandi’s promise of approximately $40 million for rural development projects, as well as assurances that they would receive land and livelihoods training as part of reintegration activities.  Although many public documents state that all ex-combatants have received some type of assistance, the reality is that very few have received any assistance at all.  They live in remote districts where few if any government officials or agency has visited, and the assistance that they may have received has come through tsunami relief, which was far more broadly distributed and tracked than any relief to former GAM Members.  Indeed, the tsunami relief (Multi-Donor) funds were significantly lacking in any mandated provisions for ex-combatants and their particular issues and needs.  Notes one publication, “In their rush to provide assistance to tsunami victims, many international agencies signed undertakings that they would not ‘interfere’ in the conflict.  By and large the US$600 million Multi-Donor Fund (MDF) could not be used in conflict-affected areas that were not hit by the tsunami. As a result, there has been a significant discrepancy between the aid reaching tsunami-affected areas and that to many heavily conflict-affected regions, creating an artificial dichotomy between post-tsunami and post-conflict Aceh.”

Many of the authors of the documents extolling the (relative) success of the reintegration programs were in fact hand-picked by those government officials eager to put a successful face on the reintegration issue, and much of the data and conclusions are suspect.

In successive Governor’s Decrees, BRA (the agency responsible for reintegration) has been tasked with “formulating programs for the reintegration of former GAM into society in the fields of government, political participation, integration, and community empowerment in the social and economic spheres.” Public documents also indicate that BRA “has managed to directly facilitate individual assistance to approximately 20,000 conflict actors.”  This is not true.  Very little money has flowed directly to former combatants.  The reason for this are presented eloquently in a number of publications, usually accompanied by complaints from BRA as to why they could not comply, but the results are the same: approximately 15,000 fighting-age males in Aceh province feel as though they have been abandoned by the government that they believed, through the peace accord, had promised to welcome them as citizens with bright futures.

The violence surrounding the elections is a culmination of sentiment that has been percolating in Aceh for years.  The Aceh party [PA –Partai Aceh], comprised of former GAM members, is furious with Governor Irwandi [former PA and now PNA] for what they perceive as near treasonous actions towards them.  BRA and other agencies have not bothered to address the issue of appropriate reintegration and what it means.  Much-needed education and vocational training programs, land allocations, agriculture and livestock and training have never been launched, despite claims to the contrary.  “Field reports” go out of their way to explain the complexity of the MoU and how it can’t be implemented easily due to language regarding individual vs. community-wide benefits.  Partai Aceh is now seen as filled with strong-arming thugs who disrupt elections in order to get their needs met and who have their fingers on the pulse of all large development projects.  In a sense, these non-3,000 former GAM members have played as cast—marginalized, ignored troublemakers who according to those in power should have been grateful they weren’t all rounded up and dispatched.

These former combatants extend through the province like a web, earning money by growing marijuana, logging illegally in protected forests, and sometimes committing robbery and shootings for hire, trying to compensate for the sustainability the government refuses to give them, says it has already given them.  They are also resourceful, determined, and in some cases very well-respected in the communities they inhabit, and their disgust with the care that has been extended them and their families transmits exponentially through the districts so that young men in remote villages with few opportunities of their own begin to see these disenfranchised fighters as their role models.

It is JMD’s belief that far more attention should be paid to providing education assistance (high school equivalency programs) and vocational training to former combatants, and that the Acehnese government can facilitate this initiative quite easily.  The hardest thing for NGOs to address is a community of former GAM saying “Our government gave us nothing. We were promised land and training.  We were promised that we’d be able to care for our families legally and respectfully.  There is no way for us to survive now except through violence and crime.”  Because we can’t tell them “No, that’s not true, you weren’t abandoned, your government cares about you.”