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Showing posts with label EDFF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label EDFF. Show all posts

Saturday, November 8, 2014

World Bank's response re: AAA/Keumang raises more questions than it answers . . . and $6.7 million still unaccounted for


Last week I wrote a letter to World Bank, addressed to one of the compilers of the 65-page EDFF Completion report expressing shock and surprise that it had left JMD out of the final EDFF report as the DSF subcontractor for IOM’s Arabica coffee project (2009-2011).  I was stunned, I tell you—there it was, big as life on the chart: “IOM had no local partner.”  How many hands and eyes did that report have to pass (including IOM’s), and still they omit JMD’s name? Especially considering that one of the requirements of getting EDFF funding was that a foreign NGO MUST have a local partner.

I also asked some slightly pointed questions regarding the AAA/Keumang project, which the report had rated as “moderately unsatisfactory.” 
No, really?

Well, knock me over with a feather, I received a response from their Jakarta office of External Affairs this week, apologizing for the oversight and promising to include JMD in its amended report, and offering some additional (but not much) information on the ill-fated $6.7 million project that never materialized.

The email stated in part that “With regard to your query about the Action Aid Australia and Keumang Foundation sub-project, the Implementation Completion Report has indicated that this project faced a number of implementation delays and procurement issues (page 49), and was scaled back as result of extensive project monitoring. We attach below the link to the report for reference:

I thought this was cute as the dickens, since my email to them had quoted this very report and mentioned this very page.  So their answer was to quote me back my question.  Probably because the question's subtext went something like this: “You would have only attributed ‘the project’s failure to a number of implementation delays and procurement issues’ and labeled it ‘scaled back as a result of extensive project monitoring’ if you had never visited the project site or did any comprehensive examination of reports.”  I do believe that ‘scaled back as a result of extensive project monitoring’ really means “worked like mad to figure out something different since the original scope was impossible from the outset, the banks were never on board with the scheme, the implementing partner was crooked, and the lead NGO had little idea of what it had gotten into.”  But that would mean that $6.7 million was not well spent, and that just wasn’t something that anyone wants to admit, not at this late date.

The email went on, however, stating that “in February 2014, the World Bank Group announced the debarment of Mr. Yusri Yusuf, Director of the Keumang Foundation, . . .  for a minimum period of five years, in response to allegations of fraudulent and coercive practices under the Aceh Economic Development Financing Facility (EDFF) Project.” The link explains that “an investigation by [the World Bank’s] Integrity Vice Presidency reveal[ed] evidence that Mr. Yusuf submitted fraudulent expenses and made threats in an effort to have the fraudulent expenses paid.  The debarment represents the first sanctions resulting from coercive practices.”

The AAA/Keumang project ran (if you can call it that) from 2008-2009.  Why did the World Bank take 5 years to make the announcement? Why has AAA been so loathe to rat out what was clearly a horrible agency (whose name still makes people spit on the ground every time JMD staff mentions it)?

My response to the folks in External Affairs:

Dear Ms D----

Thanks so much for your prompt reply.  We appreciate your amendments to the EDFF final report, which will now state that JMD was the subcontractor for IOM's Arabica coffee improvement project in Central Aceh.

We are still interested in the AAA/Keumang project, in that we had written to AAA and World Bank several months ago offering to conduct a monitoring and evaluation visit based on AAA's final report to World Bank/EDFF, a copy of which was forwarded to us by AAA. (We were going to seek a small amount funding for this evaluation from either USAID, WB or another interested donor, and wanted to make sure that it would be a useful addition to EDFF's closeout documents.)

JMD was interested in this project for two reasons: 1) it had been conducting a small but successful cocoa improvement and integrated farming project in the same area since 2009, and was hoping to build on AAA's existing work, and 2) JMD had been asked by a cocoa processing company to provide specific IPM trainings to farmers in some of the locations indicated in AAA's report as containing their beneficiaries.  In March 2012 and again in early 2013 and 2014, staff traveled to those areas to determine the extent of the AAA/Keumang project's completion, to avoid duplication of services.

With very few exceptions, staff could find no evidence of any of the project goals as being completed in terms of construction, materials/equipment, or pre-paid services such as 5-year advance payments for rental facilities.

Since Keumang was tasked with, among other things, participatory rural appraisal and developing baseline data, we understand that it is difficult to gauge the extent to which these particular services were delivered and the funds legitimately allocated to this component.  But as a small agency that was not given the opportunity to bid on this project, and who could most likely have completed it successfully for far less than half of the $6.7million total cost, JMD is interested in learning where exactly  that $6.7 million went.  AAA reports that it spent all of its allocation, and yet both your report and theirs state that many interventions were "scaled back." 

We were not allowed to see the financials for this project, and so have had to make some assumptions based on information which may be incomplete.  However, to date we have not encountered anyone acquainted with that project who knows of any part of it, save one-half of a co-op's construction, that was completed. 

Prior to making any claims of fraudulent activity regarding this project in the link you have provided, we wanted to see if we could pursue the matter through a formal evaluation to determine exactly what services were provided to the 4,000 farmers in north/east Aceh.  Our primary goal is to help these communities become economically self-sufficient stewards of the natural resources that surround them; encouraging production of this carbon-neutral commodity is beneficial to the entire province.   By highlighting the components of this project that have not been sufficiently addressed, we hope that possible future funding requests will be understood by the donor community as not duplicating an effort already addressed by EDFF.

Thanks again for your time and assistance.

See? I can be diplomatic when I want to be.
But it’s killing me, because still, nobody knows (or is telling) where that $6.7 million went. 

And next time, I’ll tell you something even more bizarre: reports that in 2012, supposedly long after this project closed and slunk away and AAA left Indonesia, AAA signed MoUs with Bappeda in Aceh for the same project . . . it’s like the Twilight Zone, I swear.

Thursday, October 23, 2014

Part VII: we trace the phantom databases to their crypts in the ether, and realize that there is no centralized repository of any reconstruction project. What fun!


Although I dearly love yellow journalism and innuendo, I also love getting truthfully to the bottom of things.  So after I wrote the last post I wondered, maybe I am just a stinky researcher.  Maybe the RAN database is operating happily somewhere and I’m just too thick to figure out how to access it.

So I called Synergy and asked ‘em.

The very nice tech, who remembered the project though he was not with the company then, confirmed my fears: when BRR (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi --Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias) disbanded in 2009 and transferred whatever administrative documents they had to Bappenas  (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional --National Development Planning Agency Republic of Indonesia), Bappenas let the system lapse.  Since part of the fee included Synergy’s web hosting services (a monthly cost) Bappenas never paid the fee, and all the data went into the ether.

I asked if somehow, someone could have downloaded it to another medium. The Synergy tech said that it was possible that a hard copy was made (a bagillion pages) but he was doubtful.  The system was designed to be able to shift over to another platform, so possible, he suggested, someone might have done that. There was one tech at Bappenas who the tech thought might have done something with the database, and he gave me a name, and I’ll look him up . . . but I don’t have high hopes that after 10 years he is still there.  Because we do not see any vestige of this database anywhere.

The tech comforted me by saying that Synergy designs a lot of databases for countries that do the same thing that Aceh did: use the system while the system administrators are there, but fail to have a universal buy-in to the system as a permanent part of government planning, and fail to allocate resources towards its maintenance and training of IT personnel.  Remember I said I didn’t know if Maldives was still using RAN?  Well, it’s not.  The only country is Sri Lanka, and they have adapted it to do national budget tracking and it is quite useful.  I told Simon that perhaps Indonesia’s pragmatic and youthful new president Jokowi might like to hear that BRR had purchased a VERY expensive database for Aceh that was no longer being used and maybe he could have it tweaked to do national economic development planning . . . and Simon practically squeaked with joy.
At my next luncheon with him and the First Lady I’ll be sure to bring that up.

But seriously, BRR/World Bank paid for the development of this custom-made-for-Aceh database, and its “shell” has not been discarded.  It’s just waiting at Synergy for someone to use it.

But do not think that BRR stopped at one database, no siree.

Little Merry Sunshine, so they have named me, and so I believed that somewhere was information regarding the AAA/Keumang project (remember them?  The thing that got us started?) so that we could find out exactly what activities were performed in the field, and write a proposal to a donor asking for funds to complete a post-project evaluation.

(Okay, I’ll admit that I had a pretty good idea of what this evaluation would show—bupkus—but I think it is important for the donor (and recipient) community in Aceh—and anywhere else tons of aid is going these days—to see that unless you hold agencies and individuals accountable for their promises, you just throw money away and end up with a vast quantity of nothing in an area which on paper says received overwhelming support for thousands of people.  So when they a) ask for more or b) malign the government for not keeping promises, the administrative response is “ungrateful hordes.”  When it should be “My god that agency just ripped us off for $6 million and 4,000 people are now starving and really mad at us.”)

Sorry.  Where was I?
Oh, right.
Well, I came across a document that heralded another love-child of BRR and World Bank, and it was called KNOW, or the BRR Knowledge Center, and it was funded in 2008, one year before BRR disintegrated and prior to RAN being dismembered. Here’s how it’s described on BRR's Wikipedia page:

The BRR Knowledge Centre (KNOW) is dedicated to the preservation of data and management of information related to the rehabilitation and reconstruction programme in Aceh and Nias (2005-09). KNOW was established by BRR in June 2008 through support from the Multi Donor Fund and in partnership with UNDP. Its principle activities include the collection, cataloging and classification of documents and other media formats and to enable this information to be accessed for research and reference purposes.

There is no longer a working link to this site.  Former BRR officials admitted to JMD staff that it was too complicated for anyone left in Aceh to manage.  And it was a piece of cake compared to RAN.  
 So: two down . . .

KNOW and RAN were born, and died, before EDFF.  So it stands to reason that unless there was yet another database created, all the EDFF funds ($50 million) would have no tracking mechanism other than what their respective implementing agencies kept at their own HQs.

I contacted a former colleague who worked with BRR and refers to himself as “the only person who knew anything that came close to the whole story of reconstruction.” He reported having no knowledge of either KNOW or RAN and “didn’t much pay attention” to what went on after BRR closed.  Of course he didn’t.  Like everyone else, he’d already collected his money and gone home.  Who cared if anything actually worked or was sustainable?

We wrote back and forth several times.  After he saw I wasn’t going to go away and didn’t really think he was much of an expert if he didn’t even know about BRR’s tracking systems, he changed his tune and started telling me he felt my pain, and was quite disillusioned himself at the end.
Uh-huh.
My response:
“ . . . It is very difficult to tell, 10 years later, which reconstruction efforts were truly useful and sustainable.  There is a 104-page BRR document with which I¹m sure you¹re familiar: 10 Management Lessons for Host Governments Coordinating Post-disaster Reconstruction, but it¹s an overview, not an objective database.
   “Many people at BBF and JMD have over the past 3 ­4 years tried to get information from former and current reps of the UN, WB, USAID, DAI, and several of the larger implementing partners regarding large livelihoods and infrastructure projects funded through MDF and later through EDFF. We have also investigated road reconstruction projects in the eastern part of Aceh with an eye towards understanding which roads got built or repaired, and which did not, and why.  Which of course leads to the depressing paradox of the end of the conflict signaling a commercial and environmental destruction free-for-all involving foreign interests complicit with government officials in the name of "economic development."  But you know all this.
    “What tiny JMD wants is to be able to matter, in the future, with respect to providing needs-driven rather than donor-driven development. And what BBF, now JMD's administrative donor, wants to do is illuminate the failure of the "large system" to address anything but the most basic of emergency response needs, choosing instead to focus on what the large NGOs could dream up in multi million-dollar "sustainable development" proposals that robbed the local NGOs of their ability to retain employees, compete for funding, or participate collectively in the recovery of their own province. 
   “We're a little vexed, you see.
   “But we were hoping you could shed some light on the trajectory of the reconstruction funds from extremely useful and lifesaving earlier good works to a series of projects with dubious ability to be sustainable and with no consideration for the conflict-affected areas that BRR promised to include in the MDF disbursement.”

The silence, I tell you, was deafening.

But wait!
Did I say that was the last of the databases???
Surely not!

We are forgetting the first database, the granddaddy of all repositories, started in 2005 and the one, apparently, that RAN and KNOW thought they could out-do: “e-Aceh!”


Bappenas, those lords of information technology, launched e-Aceh in May of 2005, claiming that “In response to the need of transparency and effective coordination” e-Aceh “is intended to be an information tool for everyone involved in the rapid and coordinated recovery process.” It is  the “unitary information sharing portal” designed to “strengthen the fiduciary framework surrounding the implementation of the [Aceh recovery strategy] and to support the rapid & coordinated multi-actor recovery.” Ulp.

And if that weren’t enough, “The information available in e-Aceh includes: rehabilitation & reconstruction planning & public consultation; program, projects & activity implementation; procurement information; private funds tracking; sectoral information; results-orientated monitoring & evaluation; situation reports; complaints handling &monitoring; job & volunteer opportunities.”

They list e-Aceh’s website. Go ahead and click on it.  If you like Chinese smut.

So: quick recap: 2005: e-Aceh developed and dropped like hot potato, 2006 RAN developed, 2008 KNOW developed, 2008 KNOW dies, 2009 RAN plug pulled.

Now that we’ve established that there is no documentation confirming that any of the billions of dollars in projects ever was satisfactorily completed, we will turn to the EDFF—the last $50 million—and how Bappenas, Bappeda, and AAA/Keumang fit into a bizarre Reconstruction Time Warp.



Tuesday, October 21, 2014

Part VI:EDFF, the Multi-Donor Fund, and the case of the vanishing databases



When I first started doing projects in Aceh in 2005, all of us (the NGOs, the community groups, everyone) were told that we had to enter all our programmatic and financial information on a database called RAN. 
As you remember, BRR (Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency of Aceh and Nias) was established to coordinate the recovery program and to jointly administer the reconstruction funds ($7 billion) with World Bank acting as fiduciary, through its Multi-Donor Trust Fund program. BRR’s mission was “to restore livelihoods and strengthen communities in Aceh and Nias by designing and overseeing a coordinated, community-driven reconstruction and development program implemented according to the highest professional standards.”

One of the things BRR (or rather, its well-paid international consultants) did very, very well was create impressive hundrd-page documents outlining the proojects, heralding their successes, and making even their failures (“lessons learned”) sound positive and hopeful. (their 16-book, 3,200 "BRR Books" series is a marvel.) One of the shorter documents  at 23 pages was a Power Point Presentation on the RAN Database.
Here is what BRR said about it:
What is the RAN Database?
•RAN Database is a system for collecting, tracking, analyzing and displaying project  and funding information.
Who will use it?
•NGOs, donors, BRR, local government, media and the public will have access to RAN Database and to paper based reports.
How will RAN Database benefit the reconstruction effort?
•RAN Database will provide up to date, transparent and accountable information on  the recovery process in Aceh and Nias.
•RAN Database will be used by BRR to coordinate more effectively, pinpoint gaps
and overlaps in the recovery process and resolve bottlenecks and issues.
•RAN Database will enable all organisations to plan and coordinate their projects with
other actors working in the same sectors and locations.

Sounds great!! 
But let me tell you, even in its heyday, with IT personnel at their battle stations, and money flowing like wine, none of us could wrestle this multi-tentacled monster to the ground.   Still, the developer (Synergy) touted it as a godsend: “The RAN Database won the Innovative Government Technology Award in the Information Management category at the 2008 FutureGov Summit. RAND was . . . recognised as an innovative model of information management that has successfully promoted improvement in public services, modernisation of government administration and efficiency of public sector management.” 

And just as soon as it appeared, with a halo round its head, it disappeared.
Well, that's not entirely true; the website still exists, with a helpful list of 500+ recipient agencies.  But every link is broken and no one is maintaining the site.

http://rand.bappenas.go.id/RAND/rc?requesttype=html&topmodel=[AM_MonoFrame]&now=1413834974744&sessionid=141383497335656&clickedModelId=*54# 

I do have to say, however, that its Help section and instructions for using the thing, were it live, are quit extensive, so I am sure that the database itself exists.
Just not in Aceh.
http://rand.bappenas.go.id/RAND/Documents/help/Application/index.htm
 
It has no backup that anyoe knows of.
It stopped being used after 2 years.
Why?
First and foremost, because of the same bloody thing that I have been harping about in this space for over 5 years: no one ever thought, with all their money and all their wonderful ideas, to teach Acehnese survivors how to implement the projects that were supposed to “save” them.
So when the highly paid IT people left, no one knew the system, including government employees, BRR, Bappenas, Bappeda, World Bank’s PMU, etc.
I wish I could think that this was just a horrible oversight.
But I can’t.
Those in charge simply did not care about sustainability.  They operated a reconstruction program in recovery mode, and because of that, the province has neither recovered nor been reconstructed.

But I digress.

The BRR document goes on to say that “Within the RAN Database, Synergy developed a number of other systems to build the capacity of the Government to track tsunami reconstruction and enhance the management of the work-flow processes. These included a Donor/Partner Profiles Module and a Concept Note Submission and Approval Module for organizing the bottom-up and top-down budget planning process of the reconstruction. The Concept Notes online submission and approval process involved the entire NGO community in sharing data on their planned activities for better coordination.  
Ahahahahahahahahahaha.  
 The RAN has become the central coordinating database for Tsunami recovery data in Indonesia, tracking 1700 projects and a total of USD 3.7 billion in commitments.  

And nobody bothered to use it or maintain it .

“Synergy worked with the government of Indonesia to define Sector specific Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for measuring progress of reconstruction at various levels including the project level and overall sector level.”

If these KSI’s existed in document form, they are in the wind now.

“RAN provides a tool to analyze trends of KPIs against baseline and target values, as well as financial and other project data. The RAN was also integrated with the Regional DAD that includes information from other Tsunami affected countries including Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Maldives. “

Could be.  Haven’t chatted with  Maldives yet. But over the past year when I have quizzed former colleagues working with both NGOs and directly with the Indonesian government regarding this and other possible locations about programmatic information concerning any of the MDF/EDFF projects, no one has mentioned this database as being an information archive .  It appears to have been a multi-million dollar boondoggle from right out of the gate, global prizes notwithstanding.  Don't get me wrong--I think Synergy developed a bang-up program.  I don't know whether it was charged with teaching anyone to use it, however.  Someone kind of fell down on the job on that one.

So counting on RAN as being the receptacle of any further information on AAA’s cocoa improvement project, or Keumang’s community development/participatory rural appraisal work in the five districts, was pretty much out of the question.

Happily (in a surreal, mildly hysterical John Waters sort of way), EDFF, MDF and the World Bank had not run out of money to spend on phantom databases.  I was next introduced to something called KNOW--the kinder, gentler reconstruction database.

Since there are no appropriate photos to accompany this post (unless photos of me crying into a big handkerchief and gnashing my teeth in frustration will do), I’ll stop here.  More tomorrow!

RAN Database gush-fest:

Friday, October 17, 2014

The case of the $6.7million phantom cocoa improvement project, part V


There are lots of things that JMD does well, and maybe the reason it has had such success in Aceh is because it is so small, and has such a clearly defined focus: sustainable livelihoods for people in nearly-inaccessible places.  And by inaccessible I mean too far away from the capital for large NGOs to make it worth their while, too far into territory where ex-combatants are still pretty furious about the short shrift they’ve been given by the government, and too remote for government departments to visit very often.  As soon as we had addressed emergency housing and health issues in Aceh Jaya, the epicenter of the 2004 tsunami, JMD went inland, to those areas that had been ravaged not only by the tsunami but by the conflict as well.  So the agency became quite familiar with what needed doing in the northeastern part of the province, and we let the large international agencies continue to work around the fringes of the capital and, to some extent, in the central highlands, where JMD acted as implementing partner for an Arabica coffee improvement project. 

But JMD’s forte was its intimate knowledge of districts included in AAA/Keumang’s cocoa farmer improvement proposal: Aceh Timur, Pidie, Pidie Jaya, Bener Maria, Aceh Utara.
That was one of the reasons we though we could be helpful: staff knew the local leaders, and were familiar with the current projects and local NGOs implementing them.  It would be relatively easy for us (if we secured a small amount of funding) to take AAA’s final report and conduct a program/activity monitoring evaluation. Obviously, Keumang, having left the province, and AAA, no longer working in Indonesia, could not provide this.
When I wrote (twice) to AAA, however, and called (twice) their corporate offices, I was met with silence.  Not “no thanks.”  Not “It’s really not necessary, but how kind of you.”  Nothing.  Zip.  It was as if, with that offer, the agency had decided I was too much trouble to even communicate with. Or did they just hope we would go away and not bother to evaluate what was appearing to be more and more of a mere phantom program?

So we decoded to find out what type of narrative document was on file with World Bank at the PMU (Project Management Unit).

Now, the PMU of any project strikes fear in the hearts of most implementing agencies.  It’s kind of like the IRS: they exist in some shadowy but very real way, they demand lots of paperwork, and stern-looking, overdressed people make visits when things are really going south, but you never really know to whom they contractually owe their allegiance. Whose side are they on?

In the case of the EDFF funds, the PMU were World Bank employees (as always) but they seemed to have a much larger role in program implementation than in other countries—possibly because the “capacity,” as some like to say, of the recipient agency and its subcontractors was not up to par with WB regulations.  So even large agencies like AAA and IOM and World Wildlife Fund had PMU members trotting round after them because let’s face it, no one had ever been to post-tsunami, post-conflict Aceh before, or had worked with suddenly-flung-together local NGOs or, for that matter, been given so much money in such a short span of time. And neither had any World Bank Branch.  As one World Bank manager told me last year, “No one in that office had ever dealt with that much money.  There were a lot of, well, competence problems.  But the weird thing is, most of those people who were with the PMU, and all of World Bank in Indonesia, were promoted to positions in other countries, just because the amount of money they were given to manage was so huge.  It didn’t have anything to do with how good they were at their job—it was just that they got to say, ‘Look, I handled a $50 million portfolio’ and up the ladder they went.”

Comforting, huh?

But I wanted to make sure that there really weren’t any more documents, or evaluations, or monitoring visits conducted for the AAA program on file at World Bank or whatever passed for the post-EDFF entity in Aceh.

So I asked our Aceh staff to see if they could contact someone at World Bank in Jakarta to find out where they had what I assumed was an enormous database of projects. 
What we discovered was that a) no one at the PMU in Jakarta would talk to us, and b) a staff member’s associate, who had been on the PMU during the height of the EDFF funds dispersal, told him (before he stopped talking altogether) that there was no database, there were no records, and that the PMU was basically a bunch of badly-trained wannabe bureaucrats who had all left the province, and that we’d never get anything out of World Bank, programmatic document-wise, so we should just stop looking.

We will take a nice jaw-dropping pause here, and a moment of silence to reflect upon $7billion worth of international assistance and no centralized database of programs, activities, or evaluations.  Financials, yes.  There were enough fiscal outlay justifications and balanced budgets to sink a container ship.  But not one document stating that yes we saw the health clinic building, or the 5 fruit transport trucks, or the vastly improved lifestyle of the new shrimp farmers.  I’m not saying that the implementing NGOs themselves did not have in their own offices --and subsequently online--volumes and volumes and exhaustive exit study after exit study of their projects and their fabulous effects on the province and their (get me the vapors) “lessons learned.” But the projects had no independent evaluation component, and the fiduciary (BRR/WB) did not require one, or, after a while, any project/activity narrative.

There’s certainly more to this onion than the outer layer I’ve peeled off here, so next time I will tell you about the RAN database and its spawn of other brainstorms from the (very well-funded) Good Idea Fairy, and why they all went belly-up, leaving me and JMD wondering how we could ever hope to find out if it was true that AAA/Keumang had mishandled a good portion of their allocated $6.7 million, or if indeed anyone cared.

(And by the way, if anyone reading this has some information that can demonstrate to me why I am dead wrong about this, please get in touch with me because I would dearly love to believe that all these funds were appropriately spent and  these projects that we cannot find really do exist and are doing well.  Nothing would please me more.  I'm not in this for the yellow journalism, believe me.)

Saturday, October 11, 2014

The case of the $6.7 million phantom cocoa improvement project, part IV

At last I am returning to the story of Action Aid Australia’s  $6.7 million EDFF project in 2009 called Improving Competitiveness of Aceh Cocoa Value Chain to Increase Farmers Income, Create Jobs and Alleviate Poverty, and their local implementing partner, Keumang Foundation, and how through a series of investigations worthy of an Indonesian version of Inspector Clouseau we discovered that the project never existed. 

I spoke of my emails to AAA, the documents they sent me indicating that they had never completed the project or done a follow-up, and that great chunks of the project that had been paid for up front were scrapped due to the “realization” after the fact that those components were never feasible.  And these were only the parts that were available through the incomplete document—the complete one, with financials, having been sent to the World Bank (we assumed).

You must go back and read my August 28 post; it really is a corker.

So the next thing we did, simultaneously, was scour the countryside for the implementing partner (Keumang) and contact AAA’s US headquarters, since they had disappeared from Indonesia.

What JMD staff on the ground found out about Keumang was that it wasn’t ever really a sustainable livelihoods agency; rather, it was a group of data collectors and participatory rural appraisers who had just finished a project for the Australian government’s agriculture research department called “Integrated soil and crop management for rehabilitation of vegetable production in the tsunami-affected areas of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam province, Indonesia.” http://aciar.gov.au/files/node/12948/fr2010_15__19567.pdf

Apparently they had performed adequately, and the 300+ page report states that they were in charge of basically getting the farmers together and helping the agency administer surveys. 
It may have been merely a case of biting off more than they could chew, but no RFP ever went out, so AAA probably just used them on the recommendation of this project, which was about the most lunkheaded thing I can think of to do, since what AAA was proposing was worlds away from community surveys: it was construction, fleet procurement, logistics, investment banking, training, co-op development, value chain improvement, actual agricultural knowledge . . . I have to lie down just thinking about what a bunch of geniuses this group was. 

But soon, as the final cocoa improvement report hints, AAA’s international people realized that they were being used by this sneaky faux-NGO, or else they just did not know how to control this big of a project with this incompetent a local partner, and so they justified all over the place as to why they had to spend the money the way they did.

Meanwhile, after I was taken off “hold” at AAA’s US headquarters, I was told that yes, indeed, they no longer had a presence in Indonesia, but that one of their Pacific representatives would get back to me.
Twice I called, and twice received the same message.
No one has any intention of getting back to me.

The representative who had returned my emails in 2013 (who had forwarded me the “final” 2010 report) had asked that we not use any of this information publically without contacting them.  Believe me, I tried.

What I wrote and asked her was what she thought of JMD performing the final program evaluation that AAA could not do because of the disappearance/demise of Keumang. World Bank blacklisted/suspended them in October 2013, at which point we fund out that they were NOT a local agency but ANOTHER international NGO (from Sri Lanka) posing as Acehnese.  Nice work!). http://www.treasury.gov.lk/notices/default-suspended-lis.html

It was clear at this point that AAA had washed its hands of Aceh and cocoa farming assistance, that no one was going to return any of that $6.7 million that was unspent, and that the only positive thing to do was to perform a post-project evaluation of the whole thing, which we were certain World Bank would love, and which the Provincial government would thank us for.  After all, weren’t bureaucracies always mad for those “lessons learned” documents that showed how to yank victory from the jaws of defeat?

Besides, by conducting this evaluation, JMD could do two important things: 1) learn a lot about the area in which it wanted to expand in terms of farmer assistance, and 2) network with communities that had been severely burned by this project, in order to re-establish their faith in civil society and non-profit assistance.  So we asked AAA if it would mind if we looked for additional funding to conduct this evaluation based on the report document we had.

I know you think you know what comes next, but you will be very surprised to learn just how convoluted things get, especially when this project that never existed refused to die even in the minds and on the books of Aceh government officials who still believe that it exists, much like the tooth fairy or Santa.   

More to come!

Friday, August 29, 2014

Part IV: Post-project monitoring? Service delivery evaluation? What's that??


You know, I really don’t think I could stomach a career on the tell-all circuit.  I’d always be afraid of missing some salient point, some bit of exonerating information that would absolve everyone of the dirty underhanded deeds I thought they were getting away with.

And so when we first started communicating with AAA and trying to find out exactly where all that money went, we were pretty thorough.  After a while, when my first contact stopped returning emails, I called AAA’s US offices, several times.  Spoke with people “who were familiar with that project.”  Of course, AAA no longer works in Indonesia, and  none of the "directors" who were going to "get right back in touch" never did.  Their Indonesia "desk" is closed and they don’t even mention it, or their $6.7 million project on their website.

Why, it’s almost as if it never existed.

As I mentioned yesterday, even though everyone we talked to in the district swore up and down that nothing ever came of that project and that no one got any services or materials, I did not just fall off the turnip truck yesterday.  I am pretty sure that something, somewhere, went on.  Like that training in Pidie that everyone thought the government sponsored.  Well, a good agency would coordinate the project so that the government, or a local source, could take credit for it, in order to reinforce to a community that its elected officials were working for it and that people could place their trust in local institutions.

However, I am not inclined to be so magnanimous wen it comes to all the buildings that were not constructed, the vehicles (all seven of ‘em) that either were never purchased or disappeared, the trainings that, if given, went in one ear and out the other, or the reports of, after spending $6.7 million (sorry to keep repeating that; I can’t seem to get it out of my head) regarding how much production and prices improved for the supposedly 2,000 farmers the project assisted.
(I know this isn’t fair, but if they’d just given each of those farmers about $3,300 apiece—or the equivalent of 8 months’ very good salary-- everyone would have been thrilled.)

One of JMD’s staff members had a friend who used to work at the PMU of World Bank when the EDFF component was being administered.  He told us that there were no final monitoring reports of the project . . . or for most of the projects for that matter, but specifically not for this one.  He also said (and this was verified by several other NGO directors in the region) that the agency Keumang had been blacklisted by the World Bank, meaning they’d never eat lunch in that town again.  AAA, to its credit (or maybe not) never mentioned to us or in the final report that Keumang was in any way to blame for any of the activities not being completed.  I suspect that this is because AAA was not directly involved at all in the project; it collected its administrative fee and hoped that Keumang would take care of everything else. 

One could argue that this is why donor agencies did not deal directly with Acehnese NGOs to begin with.  But Keumang was a subcontractor.  I have no idea what percentage of the $6.7million it specifically received and what percentage remained under AAA’s administrative control.  No one is talking.  No one, actually, is even in the room anymore.

I’ve written to a reporter at AP—the representative from the Clinton Global Initiative I met with told me that journalists can extract information from entities that close like clams when they see me, or any other "civilian" coming.

Anyway, JMD is ever Little Merry Sunshine, and saw this as an opportunity to do what it does really well: field investigation.  Surely, monitoring and evaluation are an incredibly important part of the whole reconstruction process.  World Bank would be sitting up nights fretting over its missing post-implementation narrative.

Right?

So we wrote AAA first, commending them for all their hard work, acknowledging that a project of this magnitude must have been very difficult to manage (I can be quite courteous actually), and telling them of our fabulous idea.

Parts of the letter went like this:

We are therefore wondering what are your thoughts regarding JMD’s search for additional funding to complete the final monitoring and evaluation portion of your project.

Obviously the evaluation would not cover all the aspects of the project that were initially outlines; the report lists in detail those portions of the project that were curtailed or eliminated.  The continued implementation of good cultivation and harvesting practices, however, combined with an assessment of the success and continuation of the co-operatives as established mechanisms for increased production and economic growth, could be addressed via an instrument created by JMD.  We believe that the information gathered from this evaluation would be of great importance to the future success of smallholders who wish to take a place at the commodities table.

Would it be possible for JMD to work off the lessons and activities of your completed project and develop/implement an evaluation mechanism that would both objectively measure the success of the activities performed and provide a comprehensive blueprint for future cocoa improvement initiatives in Aceh?

And as I said, the silence was deafening.

Then JMD went back to World Bank to see who to contact regarding suggesting this type of post-project report.
What we found next shocked even us.
There weren’t any on record.

Stay tuned!