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Showing posts with label BRR. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BRR. Show all posts

Friday, October 17, 2014

The case of the $6.7million phantom cocoa improvement project, part V


There are lots of things that JMD does well, and maybe the reason it has had such success in Aceh is because it is so small, and has such a clearly defined focus: sustainable livelihoods for people in nearly-inaccessible places.  And by inaccessible I mean too far away from the capital for large NGOs to make it worth their while, too far into territory where ex-combatants are still pretty furious about the short shrift they’ve been given by the government, and too remote for government departments to visit very often.  As soon as we had addressed emergency housing and health issues in Aceh Jaya, the epicenter of the 2004 tsunami, JMD went inland, to those areas that had been ravaged not only by the tsunami but by the conflict as well.  So the agency became quite familiar with what needed doing in the northeastern part of the province, and we let the large international agencies continue to work around the fringes of the capital and, to some extent, in the central highlands, where JMD acted as implementing partner for an Arabica coffee improvement project. 

But JMD’s forte was its intimate knowledge of districts included in AAA/Keumang’s cocoa farmer improvement proposal: Aceh Timur, Pidie, Pidie Jaya, Bener Maria, Aceh Utara.
That was one of the reasons we though we could be helpful: staff knew the local leaders, and were familiar with the current projects and local NGOs implementing them.  It would be relatively easy for us (if we secured a small amount of funding) to take AAA’s final report and conduct a program/activity monitoring evaluation. Obviously, Keumang, having left the province, and AAA, no longer working in Indonesia, could not provide this.
When I wrote (twice) to AAA, however, and called (twice) their corporate offices, I was met with silence.  Not “no thanks.”  Not “It’s really not necessary, but how kind of you.”  Nothing.  Zip.  It was as if, with that offer, the agency had decided I was too much trouble to even communicate with. Or did they just hope we would go away and not bother to evaluate what was appearing to be more and more of a mere phantom program?

So we decoded to find out what type of narrative document was on file with World Bank at the PMU (Project Management Unit).

Now, the PMU of any project strikes fear in the hearts of most implementing agencies.  It’s kind of like the IRS: they exist in some shadowy but very real way, they demand lots of paperwork, and stern-looking, overdressed people make visits when things are really going south, but you never really know to whom they contractually owe their allegiance. Whose side are they on?

In the case of the EDFF funds, the PMU were World Bank employees (as always) but they seemed to have a much larger role in program implementation than in other countries—possibly because the “capacity,” as some like to say, of the recipient agency and its subcontractors was not up to par with WB regulations.  So even large agencies like AAA and IOM and World Wildlife Fund had PMU members trotting round after them because let’s face it, no one had ever been to post-tsunami, post-conflict Aceh before, or had worked with suddenly-flung-together local NGOs or, for that matter, been given so much money in such a short span of time. And neither had any World Bank Branch.  As one World Bank manager told me last year, “No one in that office had ever dealt with that much money.  There were a lot of, well, competence problems.  But the weird thing is, most of those people who were with the PMU, and all of World Bank in Indonesia, were promoted to positions in other countries, just because the amount of money they were given to manage was so huge.  It didn’t have anything to do with how good they were at their job—it was just that they got to say, ‘Look, I handled a $50 million portfolio’ and up the ladder they went.”

Comforting, huh?

But I wanted to make sure that there really weren’t any more documents, or evaluations, or monitoring visits conducted for the AAA program on file at World Bank or whatever passed for the post-EDFF entity in Aceh.

So I asked our Aceh staff to see if they could contact someone at World Bank in Jakarta to find out where they had what I assumed was an enormous database of projects. 
What we discovered was that a) no one at the PMU in Jakarta would talk to us, and b) a staff member’s associate, who had been on the PMU during the height of the EDFF funds dispersal, told him (before he stopped talking altogether) that there was no database, there were no records, and that the PMU was basically a bunch of badly-trained wannabe bureaucrats who had all left the province, and that we’d never get anything out of World Bank, programmatic document-wise, so we should just stop looking.

We will take a nice jaw-dropping pause here, and a moment of silence to reflect upon $7billion worth of international assistance and no centralized database of programs, activities, or evaluations.  Financials, yes.  There were enough fiscal outlay justifications and balanced budgets to sink a container ship.  But not one document stating that yes we saw the health clinic building, or the 5 fruit transport trucks, or the vastly improved lifestyle of the new shrimp farmers.  I’m not saying that the implementing NGOs themselves did not have in their own offices --and subsequently online--volumes and volumes and exhaustive exit study after exit study of their projects and their fabulous effects on the province and their (get me the vapors) “lessons learned.” But the projects had no independent evaluation component, and the fiduciary (BRR/WB) did not require one, or, after a while, any project/activity narrative.

There’s certainly more to this onion than the outer layer I’ve peeled off here, so next time I will tell you about the RAN database and its spawn of other brainstorms from the (very well-funded) Good Idea Fairy, and why they all went belly-up, leaving me and JMD wondering how we could ever hope to find out if it was true that AAA/Keumang had mishandled a good portion of their allocated $6.7 million, or if indeed anyone cared.

(And by the way, if anyone reading this has some information that can demonstrate to me why I am dead wrong about this, please get in touch with me because I would dearly love to believe that all these funds were appropriately spent and  these projects that we cannot find really do exist and are doing well.  Nothing would please me more.  I'm not in this for the yellow journalism, believe me.)

Wednesday, May 6, 2009

After the Spotlight Fades . . .


Sad.

--from Tempo Magazine No. 36/IX05-11 May, 2009

ACEH With BRR's mission complete, foreign donors have begun to leave Aceh. Two regents have also declined assets. ATJEH Market next to the Baiturrahman Mosque, Banda Aceh, was one of the hot spots during the tsunami on December 26, 2004. With bodies scattered between ravaged stalls, Aceh's landmark gate was buried beneath piles of rubbish brought on by the waves. Four years have passed and now Atjeh Market has become a modern market. The Rp33 billion renovation was funded by the Japan International Cooperation System. The new Atjeh Market, a half-hectare building with clear glass windows which houses 300 merchants, was officially opened last week. "I bet people would rather hang out in the market than in roadside stalls," a local youth commented.

Banda Aceh is like a girl who just put her makeup on. A four-year reconstruction process which involved hundreds of organizations from all over the world has left luxurious buildings and facilities throughout Aceh. Bridges, houses, schools, public health clinics, subdistrict offices, mosques, airport, hospitals, and roads all look shiny-at least on the outside. The lavish physical condition added flavor to the completion of the Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation & Reconstruction Agency's (BRR) mission on April 16. Many other NGOs and donor institutions-both local and foreign-have also completed their missions in Aceh. The world spotlight that shone on Aceh in the post-tsunami period hasfaded.BRR chief, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, breathed a sigh of relief at the completion of his agency's mission. "The government considers that we have done a good job," he told Adi Warsidi from Tempo. In the last four years BRR has implemented various post-disaster recovery projects in Aceh and Nias worth around Rp80 trillion. The funds came from the government, public donations and international aid. According to Kuntoro, BRR has reached 94.18 percent of the targets in the master recovery plan formulated by the National Development Planning Board. After it was dissolved, BRR was replaced by the Aceh Sustainable Reconstruction Agency (BKRA), which is led by the Aceh Governor, Irwandi Yusuf, as ex-officio Chairman.

Until the end of the year, BKRA has been tasked to complete BRR's unfinished works. For example, to ensure the sustainability of the Rp1.3 trillion program which was planned last year. Another task of equal importance is to formulate a master plan for speedy development of Aceh. Iskandar, BKRA's head of daily operations, reminded the public not to put high hopes in his agency. "Our authority is limited," he said. "We only do coordinating activities with various related parties." Local governments and the representative of technical departments from the central government have full authority over the execution of the programs."Our job is to maintain the harmonization," Iskandar explained.

Although generally there have not been any problems, the handover of assets to the local governments still faced a number of obstacles. First is the obscure asset verification process. Two regencies, West Aceh and Southwest Aceh, refused to accept the assets because of the lack of clarity. Ramli M.S., the West Aceh Regent, declined BRR's Rp193 billion for his area."We do not really know what the assets are and what their conditions are," Ramli said. "It is like buying a cat in a sack and we don't want that."In his experience, the condition of the buildings and facilities built by BRR could not be guaranteed 100 percent as fit. The assets often do not meet criteria or are unfit for use. For example, a sea embankment in Ujung Kareung, Meulaboh, does not function properly. There are also buildings with leaking roofs. "Most of the houses of subdistrict heads in West Aceh cannot be used," he said. According to Ramli, the documents detailing BRR's assets should first be verified jointly with the local governments before they are handed over. Such procedure is normally done by the donor organizations and NGOs. "We have requested BRR's project documents for joint verification," Ramli said "But until the end of BRR's term, the request has not been granted."

Iskandar, BKRA head of daily operations, stated that the issue of assets certainly has to be resolved. "A team from the Finance Department will come to evaluate," said Iskandar. After the central authorities have done the verification, the Finance Department will hand over the assets to the local governments. The second issue is the fund. Aceh Deputy Governor, Muhammad Nazar has declared the local authorities' commitment. "We are ready to maintain the assets left by BRR," he pledged. However, the fund has to be requested from the central government. "It is no longer possible to use the fund from the regional budget, Nazar said. So far, the government's response has been good. "But we still do not know how much will be allotted," he said.

The third and main issue is the capacity of the regional bureaucracy. "It's been a public secret that the bureaucracy is not very effective," said Azwar Hasan, head of the Aceh Development Forum, an NGO in the field of microcredit. Many officials only have interest in projects. "Their focus is only on developing, but they forget about maintenance," he lamented. The slow and ambiguous bureaucratic work priority is indeed a national problem. "But, the situation like this is even more cumbersome in Aceh, which has just been freed of conflicts and tsunami," he said. Under such circumstance, it will be hard to maintain the assets left by BRR and donors alike. Facilities are often built without taking into consideration the long-term capability of the locals. For example, many public health clinics or pukskesmas were built in remote villages. "When there were still donors, sending doctors and nurses there was not a problem," Nursiti, a female activist from the Aceh Women's Discussion Center, explained. "Once the donors are gone, how would the villages pay for doctors and buy the medicines?"

Another example is the two public meeting buildings that were built in Banda Aceh. The electricity and cleaning fees are high. In addition, the city administration has to work hard to organize community activities in order to keep the buildings utilized. "I doubt that it can be done," Azwar bemoaned. "Since the beginning, the concept is only to make a building, without involving the community."

-- Mardiyah Chamim, Adi Warsidi